Most people in rural Africa do not have bank accounts. In this paper, we combine experimental and survey evidence from Western Kenya to document some of the supply and demand factors behind such low levels of nancial inclusion. Our experiment had two parts. In the rst part, we waived the xed cost of opening a basic savings account at a local bank for a random subset of individuals who were initially unbanked. While 63% of people opened an account, only 18% actively used it. Survey evidence suggests that the main reasons people did not begin saving in their bank accounts are that: (1) they do not trust the bank, (2) service is unreliable, and (3) withdrawal fees are prohibitively expensive. In the second part of the experiment, we provided information on local credit options and lowered the eligibility requirements for an initial small loan. Within the following 6 months, only 3% of people initiated the loan application process. Survey evidence suggests that people do not borrow because they do not want to risk losing their collateral. These results suggest that, while simply expanding access to banking services (for instance by lowering account opening fees) will benet a minority, broader success may be unobtainable unless the quality of services is simultaneously improved. There are also challenges on the demand side, however. More work needs to be done to understand what savings and credit products are best suited for the majority of rural households. * We thank Kathy Nolan and Kim Siegal for excellent research assistance and IPA Kenya for managing the eld work. We thank participants at the 5th NBER Africa conference in Zanzibar, especially William Lyakurwa, as well as participants at the Strathmore University workshop on Banking the Poor in Nairobi, for helpful comments and suggestions. This study was funded through grants from the International Growth Center, the NBER Africa project, and the International Initiative for Impact Evaluations (3ie).
formal bank account makes it more dicult for people to save, they will be unlikely to have enough saved up to cope with unexpected emergencies such as household illness. When such shocks occur, rather than withdraw money or take a loan from the bank, people might have to take much costlier actions.
3 Lack of banking access might also make it dicult for people to save up large sums or obtain credit for lumpy purchases such as start-up costs for a business, agricultural inputs, or even preventative health products like anti-malarial bednets.
Given this, expanding access to even very basic savings and credit services could have large eects. The existing evidence on this issue is somewhat mixed, however. Recent studies suggest that expanding access to microloans alone has only modest eects on most outcomes (i.e. Banerjee et al 2010; Crépon et al 2011; Karlan and Zinman 2010) . In contrast, studies of programs that increased access to both credit and savings services have found important welfare impacts (see Burgess and Pande, 2005 in India; and three studies in Mexico by Aportela, 1999 , Bruhn and Love, 2009 , and Ruiz, 2010 . Expansion of saving services alone also appears to have the potential to be benecial. In an earlier experimental study in Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2009) provided smallscale entrepreneurs access to accounts in a local Village Bank, and found large eects on business investment and income among a subsample of the study population (market vendors, who are mostly female). In a similar experiment in Nepal, Prina (2011) also nds large impacts of expanding access to savings accounts for women.
From a policy standpoint, in addition to understanding the impact of nancial inclusion, a critical question is how to achieve it. This is an area that has seen a lot of innovation in the last ve years. These recent innovations ultimately amount to either reducing barriers to access to existing nancial institutions (e.g., reducing fees); or bringing banking options geographically closer to people. which people can deposit into and withdraw money from their bank account using a non-bank agent (for example, a retail store). 5 A closely related option which has received a substantial amount of recent attention is mobile money, in which people can transfer, deposit, and withdraw money using their cell phone (Jack and Suri, 2009) . A third approach is a bank on wheels in which a vehicle visits a town at a regular interval for people to make transactions. 6 A less glamorous approach would be to simply build more ATMs or bank branches (as Equity Bank has done in Kenya with great success see Allen et al. 2011 ).
While much attention has recently been paid to these various strategies to expand access, comparatively little attention has been paid to the quality of nancial services in very rural areas. If people are not banked because they do not trust banks or banking agents, because they nd services to be unreliable, or because account maintenance or withdrawal fees are prohibitive, then expanding such awed services is unlikely to be appealing. On the demand side, little attention has been paid to understanding reasons other than access for why people may choose to stay out of the formal banking system. This paper combines survey and experimental evidence from Western Kenya to show that addressing these supply and demand factors is crucial if nancial services are to be expanded usefully to unbanked populations.
Our study takes place in an area spanning multiple villages surrounding three rural market centers in Western Kenya, and in which banking options remain very limited. In this part of Kenya, large bank branches are located only in major towns, and the villages in our study are far enough away from a town that the cost of traveling there for banking is prohibitive. Locally, there are only two options: a Village Bank , owned by share-holding villagers and aliated with a micronance organization, and a partial-service branch (essentially a sales and information oce with an ATM) for a major Commercial Bank. Both banks have substantial minimum balance requirements and withdrawal fees. The Village Bank also has an account opening fee. The Village Bank does not pay interest on deposits; eectively, neither does the Commercial Bank, at least for the poor (interest is only paid if the account balance exceeds 20,000 Ksh, or about $210).
To examine nancial access among this population, we conducted a census of 1,898 households in the study area between September and December 2009. Account ownership was quite low: only 20% of households had at least one member with a bank account. Knowledge of banking options was also limited, as only 60% of adults knew of the bank branches in the study area. Almost no one knew the fee schedule for account opening or maintenance. The 1,565 unbanked individuals formed the nal experimental study sample.
To test whether opening costs (information acquisition, account opening fees, and administrative requirements) explained the low rates of account ownership, we randomly selected 55% of the 1,565
Commercial Banks to introduce free no-frills accounts (Thyagarajan and Venkatesan, 2008) ; or the 2010 pledge by the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation to contribute of $500 million over 5 years towards increasing access to savings accounts in poor countries (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010 3 unbanked individuals to receive a free account at either of the two local banks. We paid the account opening fees and provided the minimum balance, and arranged for the banks to simplify the account opening procedure for our study participants. We did not waive withdrawal fees. The majority of people opened accounts when oered this opportunity: take-up was over 60%. But actual account usage was much lower. Only 28% of those who opened an account (18% of those randomly selected for a free account) made at least two deposits on their account in the 12 months after account opening. Many did not use the account at all.
Why didn't the other 80% of those selected to receive a free account actively use it? To shed light on this question, we administered qualitative surveys in which respondents could discuss their concerns with the various savings mechanisms available to them. A signicant proportion listed risk of embezzlement, unreliable services, and transaction fees as concerns with formal banking. Many of these concerns are valid: the fees are indeed quite high in both the Village and Commercial Bank, and the services in one branch of the Village Bank were relatively poor during this time period.
Furthermore, another branch of the Village Bank had a recent banking scandal in which withdrawals were frozen for some account holders for a long period. Not surprisingly, we nd that trust concerns are more pronounced for the village with the branch with the recent scandal, and reliability concerns are worse for those near the branch with poor service. Interestingly, these concerns were reinforced by exposure to the bank: those who did use their account were more concerned with both the risk of fraud and the lack of reliability than those who did not use the account.
We use a similar combination of survey and experimental evidence to examine the demand for formal loans. The banks oer a variety of loans which range in interest between 1.25 and 1.5% per month (16%-19.5% APR), well below that of many micronance banks in other parts of the world, 7 and well below recent estimated returns to capital, including estimates from previous work in this part of Kenya.
8 Yet, very few people take out loans. Of those in our experimental sample, only 6% had ever applied for a formal loan at baseline. As with savings options, knowledge of loan options appears extremely limited very few people know what the conditions are for loans with either bank. Further, when asked, very few people reported wanting loans for agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, despite the high estimated returns to usage in Kenya (Suri 2011; Duo et al., 2011) .
To better understand why people do not take up loans, we conducted a randomized credit intervention with two components: (1) an information intervention in which we told people about the requirements and procedures to apply for a loan; and (2) an intervention in which we gave people a voucher which lowered the eligibility requirements necessary to begin taking out loans with the Village Bank. Though the vast majority of people took the vouchers when oered them, and 40% redeemed them, only 3% of our experimental sample had even started the process of applying for a loan at the time of writing (6 months after the credit information and voucher interventions). Overall, our data reveal a number of challenges with the current supply of nancial services.
Simply expanding those existing services is not likely to massively increase formal banking use among the majority of the poor unless quality can be ensured, fees can be made aordable, and trust issues are addressed. Our results also suggest that marketing could be improved a large percentage of people lack even basic information about banking options.
Note that while our results are based on two particular banks in one part of Kenya, and concern classical banking services rather than agent-or mobile phone-based banking, the general take-away is that service quality, fees, and trust are important and often overlooked factors. Even M-Pesa, Safaricom's mobile money network in Kenya and arguably the most developed mobile money product in the world, is ultimately similar in structure to the banks we study here people must still make deposits and withdrawals in person, in cash, and the fees are substantial. Moreover, M-Pesa, as it is currently constituted, cannot function well as a bank. To guarantee solvency, Safaricom requires agents to pay in advance for any mobile money they purchase. Safaricom then holds this money in bank accounts with several large commercial banks, and gives all interest to charity (Jack and Suri 2011). Clearly, M-Pesa cannot lower fees unless it can invest its deposits for prot which, in turn, will likely require some form of regulation (for instance, deposit insurance) if people are to trust money with it.
9 On top of this, banks would lobby vociferously to prevent a new entrant into the banking sector see Mas and Radclie (2010) for evidence on this in regards to M-Pesa in Kenya. Given this, it seems that the most likely future for mobile banking is as a platform through which people can transfer money into an account in a formal bank.
10 Thus, the issues we raise here remain quite pertinent to mobile banking as well.
Our nding that a non-negligible proportion of people distrust banks generally is somewhat surprising, since the banking sector in Kenya has been relatively stable for some time: while Kenya has had a number of banking scandals, many of these were in the 1980s and 1990s (Central Bank 10 Safaricom has recently entered into a partnership with a bank to link the M-Pesa account to a formal bank account through the M-Kesho service (Opiyo 2010 
13
A nal way that people in the study area can potentially save is through mobile money, as there are a number of mobile money agents in the area. Mobile money is much more commonly used for transfers than for savings, however, for several reasons. First and most obviously, people need to have access to a cell phone (and only 47% of households in our census have a phone). Second, it is not always possible to withdraw money immediately. On the main mobile money network (M-Pesa), the currency of mobile money is e-oat. The agent holds a balance of e-oat on his own cell phone and must decide how much cash to hold to pay out withdrawals. If the agent has a large number of withdrawals on a given day, he may lack the liquidity to cover them all. On the other hand, if there are many deposits, the agent may have no e-oat left to sell to allow deposits. These sorts of problems are cited as a drawback by many respondents in our sample. In addition, M-Pesa markets itself as a money transfer, rather than savings, product. Finally, withdrawal fees are substantial (though this is true of both of the banks in our study as well). 12 The Commercial Bank also oers a youth savings account with a smaller minimum balance requirement.
13 The interest rate is variable, ranging from 2-4% within the study period.
14 See Jack and Suri (2011) and Mbiti and Weil (2011) for more detail on these issues.
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borrowers must also be visited by a loan ocer to assess the state of the business. Loans must be repaid within 6 months, with an interest a rate of 1.5% per month. Two guarantors and full collateral are required for each loan 15 
History of Financial Scandals
One of the key results of this study is that the level of interest and trust in nancial institutions is quite low among rural households. This nding is not particularly surprising when it applies to nonregulated nancial institutions, such as the Village Bank that operates in our study area, or Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs), which have somewhat charged history of nancial scandals, up to the present day. In fact, the Village Bank in our study area suered a nancial scandal at its main branch (in market A) shortly after we started working in the area. The branch manager was red for embezzlement, resulting in a months-long liquidity crisis during which existing customers were barred from withdrawing funds over $10.50 a day per customer. During the crisis, the satellite branch in market C was temporarily closed. Though nobody has ocially lost deposits, liquidity remains a problem to this day.
What is more surprising is that trust in fully regulated nancial institutions also appears relatively low, despite the fact that Kenya has had relatively few scandals specic to the regulated banking sector in recent years. Why have rural populations not embraced banks that oer insured deposits? One hypothesis is that they do not make a clear distinction between regulated and unregulated institutions, and their somewhat well-founded mistrust of Village Banks and SACCOs expands to the banking sector more generally. Another hypothesis is that they remember the various banking crises that Kenya had in previous decades, particularly from 1983 until the late 1990s.
These crises were dramatic and hugely costly. Note that these issues are not specic to Kenya. A number of other African countries had major 15 Besides these two banks, credit is available from a third institution which until recently did not take deposits.
However, that organization lends only to women with licensed businesses. 
Sample
We rst conducted a census of all households living within a 4 kilometer radius of the three market centers in our study area. The census survey collected information on demographic characteristics of the household, sources of income, as well as access to nancial services, knowledge and perceptions of available nancial services, and saving practices more generally.
A total of 1,898 households were surveyed during the census exercise. 
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Polygamy is still somewhat prevalent 8% of households are polygamous. The average household in the study area owned just under two acres of land, and had just above 4,000 Ksh ($42) in animal assets. Almost half (47%) of households owned a cell phone.
Panel B of Table 1 presents statistics on access to banking services. Only 20% of households had a member with a bank account, despite the fact that the average distance to the closest deposittaking nancial institution is only 1.6 kilometers, suggesting that physical access is unlikely to be the barrier. To construct a sample, the primary eligibility criterion was that nobody in the household had a bank account. However, we also decided to exclude all polygamous households and all households 16 This is the result of two main factors: (1) it is much less common for a widow to remarry than it is for a widower;
and (2) some men leave their family behind to work in urban areas.
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with no female head. The rationale for doing this is that those two categories of households are likely very dierent from others, yet they are too few of them to do subgroup analysis. In the case of polygamous households, another reason is that measuring expenditures and savings in such households is dicult and time-intensive.
Given this eligibility criteria, 989 of the 1,898 households in the census were selected to participate in the randomized experiment, comprising 1,565 individuals. As is to be expected, households in the experimental sample are poorer, less educated, and more likely to be farmers than other households (see Column 2 in Tables 1 and 2 ).
Experimental Design 3.2.1 Savings Experiment
After constructing the sample, we randomly selected individuals for the savings intervention. Randomization was done at the individual (rather than household) level, stratied by household composition (single female-headed or dual-headed), primary occupation, and market center. The vouchers were delivered to people in their homes. During that visit, individuals received information on how the bank and the account work, and when and how to redeem the voucher.
17
Among households with no male head, 50% were randomly selected to receive an account voucher, which was given to the female head. Among households with both a female and a male head, 20% received no voucher, 30% received two vouchers (one for each head), and 50% received one voucher (in 25% of households, the male received the voucher; in the other 25%, only the female received the voucher). In total, 55% of the sample was selected to receive vouchers.
Credit Experiment
In February 2011, a second randomization was conducted to lower informational and nancial barriers to credit. The intervention diered slightly according to whether individuals had received the savings intervention 9 months earlier.
Among those who had not received the savings intervention, half were randomly selected to receive information about local credit opportunities. Trained sta visited those individuals at their 17 The vouchers expired after 2 weeks. In practice, most of those who redeemed did so immediately. Commercial
Bank customers had to visit the branch twice, once to redeem the voucher and again two weeks later in order to pick up their ATM cards and receive training in their use.
home and delivered a detailed script explaining the rules and procedures for obtaining a loan from either of the two local institutions. No nancial assistance was given, however.
Among those who had received the savings intervention, half were selected to receive the same nancial information script as above. However, they were also given a voucher redeemable for one free share at the Village Bank (valued at 300 Ksh, or $3.20). As discussed in Section 2.1.2, one of the requirements for getting a loan from the Village Bank is that an individual must purchase a share (in addition to having a bank account). In particular, the maximum amount that anyone can borrow is four times the amount of share capital they own. While the share is not the only requirement to get a loan (in particular, people must form a group with four other bank clients who approve their loan and act as guarantors), getting a free share does lower the barrier to getting a loan.
Data
We use three main sources of data in this project. First, we have background information (described above) from the census. Second, we have administrative data on deposits, withdrawals and loan applications from the bank. All study participants that opened an account agreed to sign a waiver allowing their bank to release their bank statements to the research team. We use these bank statements to monitor the saving activity as well as the credit history of our restricted experimental sample. Third, a semi-structured survey was administered to a randomly selected half of the restricted experimental sample after 9 months. The survey asked respondents open-ended questions about their current savings practices, perceived barriers to saving, and perceptions of the various saving mechanisms available to them. For those who had received an account voucher but had not redeemed it, the survey also asked why they had not opened an account. The survey also included a number of questions about familiarity with and interest in local credit options.
Rural Households and their Money: A Snapshot
In Tables 3 and 4 we present information from the census to show how rural households in the study area save. Table 3 presents means at the household level, separately by household type. Table 4 present means at the individual level, separately by gender.
The rst striking observation in Table 3 is the fact that access to formal saving services is very 18 Nevertheless, the relatively high penetration of such accounts in even very rural areas is potentially very promising.
In contrast to the low rates of participation in formal savings, savings through informal mechanisms is quite important 56% of households have at least one member who participates in a ROSCA.
19 A ROSCA (Rotating Savings and Credit Association) is a savings group (composed of 10 to 20 members, typically) that meets on a regular basis; at each meeting, group members make a xed, mandatory contribution which goes into a pot that is then assigned to one of the members. The breakdown by household type in Panels B and C of Table 3 shows that female-headed households are much less likely to be banked than dual-headed households (9% vs. 25%). They are also less likely to use informal saving mechanisms, suggesting that their overall saving rate is lower.
The individual-level means presented in Table 4 suggest that this gap between household types is essentially driven by a gender divide: only 10% of women have banking accounts, compared to 21% of men. Similarly, only 12% of women have mobile money accounts, compared to 28% of men.
There are also major dierences between those who are primarily farmers and those who are not.
We present the statistics disaggregated by gender and farming status in Appendix Table A1 . Only many sources as they wanted (so that the categories are not exclusive). The results are presented in Table 5 . We nd that only 13% of people would be able to get even part of the money from savings. Most people would ask others for help, while others would have to sell a household asset or work more. Although it's conceivable that people could fully make up for a 1,000 Ksh shortfall by relying on others, nearly every study of inter-household risk coping suggests that this is unlikely.
Thus, it seems likely that increasing savings would better allow people to cope with shocks.
Understanding Low Levels of Formal Banking
This section discusses factors which partially explain the low observed rate of formal banking. We start by describing our baseline survey evidence. We nd that at the time our study began people knew very little about local nancial institutions, suggesting that earlier marketing activities by these nancial institutions, if any, had been mostly unsuccessful. We then present evidence from the randomized savings experiment. Overall, while we nd that reducing the account opening fees and minimizing the hassle of opening an account did induce a minority to start saving in the bank, we nd that most people did not use their accounts. Survey evidence suggests that the major reasons people did not use the bank is that they were concerned about high withdrawal fees and poor service, and that they did not trust their money with the bank. Note that given our experimental design, it is not surprising that distance to a local banking option does not appear as a major factor, as the sample was drawn from villages within walking distance of the bank. Table 6 presents data from the census on knowledge of and trust in the Village Bank, separately by branch. At the time of the census, the Village Bank had been established in market center A for nearly 10 years, in market center B for about 18 months, and in market center C for 10 months.
Survey Evidence: Baseline Interviews
Despite this, only 64% of household heads in markets A and B, and 51% in market C, had ever heard of the Village Bank. Even those who had heard of the bank did not know enough about it to have an opinion about it. Thus, when those who had at least heard of the Village Bank were asked if they would trust the bank with their money, 43% said they didn't know enough about the bank to know. Around 49% said they would trust the bank, while the remaining 8% said they would not. The main reasons for not trusting the bank were lack of familiarity and being worried about embezzlement of funds. Table 7 addresses those in the experimental sample, who were all unbanked at the time of the census, and to whom a slightly more detailed survey was administered. In this sample, we asked about knowledge of both the Village Bank and the Commercial Bank. Unsurprisingly, familiarity with local nancial institutions is lower among these unbanked individuals than in the full census Though people do not know much about either bank, most people tend to prefer the Commercial Bank (likely because it is a large, well-established bank with a national presence). When asked which institution they would prefer to have an account in, close to two-thirds of respondents said they would choose the Commercial Bank over the Village Bank.
Experimental Evidence
The randomized savings experiment allows us to test the extent to which eliminating opening fees, facilitating account opening, and providing information can increase access to formal banking. Table   8 However, many of those who opened accounts did not actively use them. In Table 8 , we dene an account as active if the respondent made at least two deposits in the year following the account opening date. We nd that only 28% of opened accounts were active. Since only 62% of people even opened accounts, this means that the overall usage rate was only 0.28 x 0.62 = 18%. In Table   9 , we show the results separately for men and women (pooling all the market centers together).
While women were slightly less likely to open accounts than men, they were 10 percentage points more likely to actively use the account if they opened one. Overall, the active take-up rate was thus higher among women than men (19.7% versus 14.0%), but still relatively modest among both groups. Overall, these results suggest that entry costs be it the cost of acquiring information, the opening fees (including minimum balance requirement) or the administrative hassle of opening an account explain only about 1/5th of the low banking rates observed in our study area.
More Survey Evidence: Debrieng Interviews
To understand what other supply factors explain the relatively low demand for formal banking we observe once the entry costs were experimentally removed, we asked respondents, in an openended way, what their concerns were with the various saving mechanisms available to them. We asked these questions to a random subset of our restricted experimental sample. The results are presented in Table 10 . We present the results separately for those in the control group (who did not receive information and assistance with account opening), those in the treatment group who did not actively use the account (whom we call non-compliers), and those in the treatment group who did use the accounts (whom we call compliers). We present results for the three formal and quasi-formal banking options available: the Commercial Bank, the Village Bank, and Mobile Money.
The main concerns raised with formal banks are transaction fees, unreliability, and risk of embezzlement. The relative importance of these concerns varies substantially between the two nancial institutions in our study area. Transaction fees are the primary concern with the Commercial Bank, which charges a at xed fee of 30 Ksh per withdrawal at the ATM, making it very costly to make small withdrawals. While these withdrawal fees could act as a commitment device to not withdraw money until a relatively large lump sum has been saved, they can also deter people from saving in the account if they anticipate needing small sums to deal with emergencies as they arise. This is in line with a related study we conducted in this part of Kenya, in which we nd that the cost of limiting liquidity exceeds its benet for many people (Dupas and Robinson, 2011).
For the Village Bank, while fees remain a major concern, substantial fractions of people also report unreliability and risk of embezzlement as problems. Among the non-compliers, 37% cite unreliability and 24% cite risk of embezzlement, suggesting that many of those who did not actively take-up Village Banking thought service quality was poor or lacked trust in the institution.
In regards to mobile banking, the most common concerns are that it requires owning a cell phone and that there are network or liquidity issues (i.e. the agent runs out of e-oat , to pay out withdrawals). Fees are less of a concern for mobile money banking than for formal banks, even though in practice the fees associated with mobile money fall somewhere in between the fees charged at the Village Bank and those charged at the Commercial Bank. Notably, trust in mobile banking is extremely high (another promising sign if mobile money is eventually to be mobilized for savings as well as transfers). Table 11 provides further qualitative evidence on these issues by disaggregating results by market center. Recall that there was a withdrawal freeze in the wake of an embezzlement scandal in Market A and that the service in Market C is spotty, so we might expect people to trust the Village Bank least in Market A and nd it most unreliable in Market C. Interestingly, Table 11 shows that this is true only of people who actively used the accounts. Though the sample of people who use their account is obviously selected, one interpretation of these ndings is that people's experience with the Village Bank reinforced the mistrust in the institution. Table 11 also reports responses to a question in which we asked people for their preferred savings options. All in all, when asked what their preferred savings mechanism would be if they could choose, over 40% of respondents answered a commercial bank. A sizeable fraction also reported the Village Bank. As expected, this share is higher in the control and compliers groups than in the non-compliers group. Somewhat surprisingly, mobile money banking was the least favorite mechanism, behind grain storage and ROSCA participation. In fact, almost 40% of the control group reported informal options (animals, ROSCAs, or saving in grain) as their preferred saving tool. Given the risks associated with these informal saving mechanisms, the fact that they remain preferred is suggestive that the formal products being oered are insucient for many people. This is consistent with the nding that close to a quarter of respondents said they had been discouraged to open a bank account by a friend.
Open questions
The evidence presented thus far has focused on supply issues. These issues only partially explain the low formal savings rates we observe in our experiment, however. Many of those in the treatment group who do not list trust, fees, or reliability as concerns still do not use the accounts. When asked directly what keeps them from saving, many of them say that their expenses are too high or that their income is simply too low for them to save at all. However, it is hard to know how to interpret these responses. Existing evidence strongly suggests that even extremely poor people can save. For instance, research in the Gambia (Shipton, 1990) Indeed, in countries like the US, where many transactions are conducted electronically, it is has been well documented that savings can be most eectively mobilized when they are unseen, for example when wage increases are automatically put into a savings account (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) or when people are automatically opt in to a certain 401(k) savings level (Carroll et al., 2009 ). Designing such products in a much more cash-based economy may be dicult, but is worth exploring. In fact, the value of mobile money (such as M-Pesa in Kenya) may be largely in making savings more electronic; it might be less costly, both in terms of transportation and time, to transfer an electronic balance to a linked savings account than to physically take cash to the bank during operating hours. It may also be less painful psychologically to devote electronic money to savings rather than to physically put cash into a savings account.
6 Understanding Low Borrowing Rates
While much of our focus has been on savings, the ipside of savings is credit. Returns to capital have been estimated to be quite high in the study area (as discussed in footnote 12), higher than the APR on loans oered by the two nancial institutions (which vary from 16-19.5 percent APR).
What keeps people from taking out such loans and reaping high returns?
We examine this issue in Tables 12-14 . To start, Table 12 describes familiarity with local credit options among our restricted experimental sample of unbanked households. As with savings, people have very limited information about credit options. Only 64% think there is a local credit option and only 38% (41%) correctly identied the Village Bank (Commercial Bank), respectively, as a credit option. Only 15% said that they knew the procedure to get a loan; interestingly, only 7% could correctly describe the procedure when asked.
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To gauge potential interest in loans, we asked people if they were interested in a loan at 1.5% monthly interest, with or without collateral requirements. While 74% said that they were interested if no collateral was required, this dropped to only 32% with collateral. We also asked people if they thought that they could qualify for a loan, and 37% said yes. Yet only 6% had ever applied for loan.
Given this low level of information, we implemented an intervention to improve information and access to credit (the details are presented in Section 3.2.2). We present two sets of results of this intervention. First, in Table 13 , we report the answers to questions we asked participants immediately after they received detailed information about local credit opportunities. While a majority of people were interested in a loan at the Village Bank, far fewer were interested at the Commercial Bank. This is likely primarily due to the fact that the Commercial Bank only lends to people with an existing business, and as shown in Table 2 , only 15% of women and 36% of men in our restricted experimental sample had a business at baseline (farming is not considered a business by the bank). What's more, most of those have a very small market vending business with very low levels of working capital, and they would most likely not quality for a loan from the Commercial Bank in any case. It is also likely that people perceive it as more dicult to qualify for a loan from the Commercial Bank even aside from the business requirement.
Among those interested in borrowing, we asked what they would want to borrow for. Few people were interested in loans for small investments like agricultural inputs. People were much more likely to report wanting to start a business or adding to business inventory with a loan. Whether these types of goals are feasible for such borrowers is an open question.
The second set of results from the experimental credit intervention is presented in Table 14 , and concerns the take-up of the share capital voucher we gave to a random subset of those who had already been oered an account voucher. By redeeming this voucher, people would be credited with one Village Bank share (valued at 300 Ksh) and thus be eligible to borrow up to four times the value of the share (1,200 Ksh). Note, however, that this is much smaller than the median desired loan size listed in Table 13 , which was 10,000 Ksh. Table 14 shows that, while 87% accepted the 20 As shown in Appendix Table A2 , these levels are even lower among farmers.
voucher when it was given to them, only 40% redeemed it, and as of the time of writing (6 months after vouchers had been distributed), only 3% of individuals had started the process of applying for a loan by making an inquiry, and only 1 person (out of 358) had applied and been granted a loan.
While we have not yet followed up with these individuals directly to ask why they did not end up applying for a loan, we did ask people about concerns about taking out loans at the time the vouchers (and information) were given out. These results are reported in Table 15 . Overwhelmingly, people report that they are afraid of losing collateral or that taking out a loan is risky. Thus, even at relatively low interest rates, the fear of losing assets overwhelmed loan demand in our study area. Clearly, this creates a serious problem in generating a market for credit, since the interest rate would have to be much higher if loans were not collateralized.
Conclusion
Without a safe place to save up money, it may be very dicult for people to take advantage of highreturn investments of many types. Likewise, without a safe place to keep an emergency cash buer, vulnerability to shocks might be very high. Recognizing this, policymakers and international aid organizations have begun to devote attention to expanding access to nancial services in developing countries, especially in rural areas where access continues to be extremely limited. This paper shows that unless serious attention is paid to the reliability and quality of nancial services oered, simply expanding access by reducing monetary or time costs will fail to eectively achieve nancial inclusion.
Our analysis generates several important prescriptions for eectively expanding nancial services to the poor. First, trust is an important reason that people do not use current banking services.
Providing stronger consumer protection through tighter regulation and deposit insurance could be very important. Second, many people are uninformed about banking options (in part because they have little or no experience with them). Better marketing from the banks themselves might be warranted. Finally, more attention should be paid to the types of products that banks provide.
While basic savings accounts do appear to be useful to a minority, more sophisticated products might be necessary for others (just as they are for many people in developed countries). For example, many people in Kenya save to deal with health emergencies, which are very common. For them, putting money into a bank that does not oer withdrawal services at night or on weekends and that has big withdrawal fees might not be very attractive. Similarly, people whose income is seasonal (such as farmers, who make up the great majority of the rural poor in Sub-Saharan Africa) might benet from products that provide stronger incentives to save as soon as they have money.
In this sense, it is good news that as many as 18% of people in our poor, rural sample took up and actively used basic savings accounts when they could access them for free. However, the evidence we presented suggests that this is a lower bound on potential demand for formal saving products. Serious attention should be paid to improving the delivery of nancial services doing so could improve the lives of millions of people. Table 4 . Baseline: How do Individuals Save? 
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